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said "In all this I don't say the busband intended the ruin of his- wife, and,
was looking for a divorce as the consequcnce ; but if the legal presumption be
applied, that any man is to be presumed
to intend the legitimate, consequences of
his deliberate acts, such a conjecture is
not unreasonable." There were some.
other circumstances, however, tendingto
show that the husband had become more
or less attachedto a female servant in
his employment, though no criminalcon-

duct was alleged or shown ; but it was
thought that this might have led the wife
to the more frequent use of morphine,
and so tended to form the habit cornplained of.
The doctrine of conducement merely,
without connivance, desire, or intention
that adultery should be committed, must
be more fully examined and considered
before it can be- held to be clearly established.
EDmunD H. BFsNxET.
Boston.
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Where there is one cause of action all the damages must be recovered. in one suit,
and for fresh damages resulting from the original wrong, a second act[on cannot be
maintained.
Where the cause of action is the negligence and unskilfulness- of the officers of a
municipal corporation in. the improvement of a street, the injury is complete und
permanent, constituting but one cause of action, and. in &suit on that cause of action
all damages present and. prospective may he recoveref, and for fresh damages resulting from the improvement, a second action will not lie.
Mitchell v. Darley Main Colliery Co., 24 Am. L. Reg. (N. S.) 432, and Brunsden v. Humphrey, Id. 369, criticised and distinguished.
Semble: A temporary wrong might be done under such circumstances as would
make it reasonable to presume that the defendants would right the wrong before a
recurrence of harm or loss, and in such cases a second action might lie for fresh
damage.
Although a municipality is not liable for errors of judgment in devising a plan
of improvement, it is liable if the lack of care and skill in devising the plan is so
great as to constitute negligence.
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John G. Berksire, for appellant.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ELLIOTT, J.-There are two paragraphs in the appellee's complaint, both alleging .that the appellant so negligently and
unskilfully graded one of its public streets as to change the flow
of surface water, gather it in one channel, and pour it upon the
lots of the appellee, greatly injuring her property.
The first paragraph of the complaint differs from the second in
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one particular, and that is in alleging that a former action was
commenced by the appellee which resulted in a judgment in her
favor. The allegations upon this subject are these: "That in
September 1879 the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant for
the damages then accrued to her by reason of the overflowing and
injury of her premises up to that time; that in March 1880 she
recovered judgment in that action for eighty dollars so accrued up
to September 1879 ; that all of said overflowings of said premises
have continued, as also the other said injuries to plaintiff's premises
ever since September 1879, when the former action was brought,
but the defendant has done nothing and made no effort to change or
prevent said flow of water over the lot of plaintiff." On these
averments the appellant founds the objection to the complaint that
it shows on its face that the matter pleaded has been adjudicated;
but as there are answers which more clearly present the question,
we defer our consideration of it until we take up those answers.
The second paragraph of the answer is in substance this: That
the improvement of the street was made under an ordinance and a
plan of the common council, duly enacted and adopted; that the
improvement of the street was, in the judgment of the common
council, necessary and proper; and that the injuries complained
of were the unavoidable result of the improvement of the street.
The sufficiency of this answer is sought, to be maintained upon
the decision in Rozell v. City of Anderson, 91 Ind. 591, but that
decision is very far from sustaining such an answer as the one
before us. In that case the evidence was not in the record, as the
opinion shows, and the court was simply called upon to determine
whether the instruction assailed was correct upon any supposable
state of the evidence admissible under the issue in the case. We
have no doubt that the ruling in that case was right upon the question as the record presented it. We hold now, as we held then,
that, as an abstract rule of law, a municipal corporation is not
liable for mere errors of judgment as to the plan of a public
improvement; but we did not then hold, nor do we now hold, that
for negligence, whether in the plan of the work or its execution, a
ihunicipal corporation is not liable. That we did not then hold
that for negligence the municipal corporation is not liable is evident
from the fact that the court, in the opinion given in that case, cites
with approval the cases which hold a municipal corporation liable
for negligence in the plan of an improvement as well as in the
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manner of executing the work. We have many cases, extending
from City of Indianapolis v. Huffer, 30 Ind. 285, down to City
of Crawfordsville v. Bond, 96 Id. 236, holding that for negligence in devising a plan, as well as, for negligence in executing it,
the municipal corporation is liable. This was, in effect, the decision
in the case appealed to this court by the appellant, involving the
sufficiency of just such an answer as that now before us: City of
North Vernon v. T7"oegler, 79 Ind. 67. The question was fully
considered, and the authorities cited in the cases of City of Evansvile v. .Decker, 84- Ind. 325; Cummins v. Mity of Seymour, 79
I-d. 491; s. c. 41 Amer. Rep. 618; Weis v. City of 17adison, 75
Ind. 241; s. c. 39 Amer. Rep. 135; Cify oj Indianapolisv. Tate,
39 Ind. 282; City of Indianapolis v. Lawyer, 38 Id. 348. The
doctrine is not only sustained by authority, but is. sound in principle. Suppose that a common council of a city determine to build
a sewer and cover it with reeds, can it be possible that the corporation c-an escape liability on the ground that the common council
erred in devising a plan? Or, to take such a case as City v. Huffer,
suppose the common council undertake to conduct a large volume
of water through a culvert capable of carrying less than one-tenth
of the water conducted t& it by the drains constructed by the city,
can responsibility be evaded on the ground of an error of-judgment ?
Again, to take an illustration from a somewhat different class
of cases, suppose the common council to devise a plan for a bridge
that will require timbers so slight as to give way beneath the tread
of a child, can the city escape liability on the ground that there was
only an error of judgment in devising the plan ?
Illustrations might be indefinitely multiplied, but it is unnecessary to pursue the subject. The only rule that has any valid support in principle is, that for errors in judgment in devising a plan
there is no liability, but there is liability where the lack of care
and skill in devising the plan is so great as to constitute negligence.
Our decisions have long and steadily maintained that municipal corporations are not responsible for consequential injuries resulting
from the grading of streets where the work is done in a careful and
skilful manner; but they have quite as steadily maintained that
where the work is done in a negligent and unskilful manner, the
corporation is liable for injuries resulting to adjacent property : City
of .Kokomo v. 3a1ahan, 100 Ind. 242, 246 ; City of Crawfordsville
v. Bond, supra; -Princetonv. Gieske, 93 Ind. 102; Weis v. City
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of Madison, 75 Id. 241 ; s. c. 39 Amer. Rep. 135; City of Evansville v. Decker, supra, and authoiities cited; Macy v. City of Indianapolis, 17 Ind. 267.
The complaint in this case very fully alleges the negligence and
unskilfulness of the defendant, and an answer admitting these allegations cannot avoid them by averring, as the one before us does,
that the negligence and want of skill were not in doing the work,
but in devising the plan. We have not considered the fugitive
denials cast into the answer, for the reason that it is now well settled
that pleadings are to be judged by their general scope and tenor,
and not by detached and isolated statements thrown into them :
Neidefer v. Chastain, 71 Ind. 363 ; W. U. Tel. Co. v. Reed, 96
Id. 195, 198.
There are several paragraphs of answer pleading a former adjudication, and we perceive no substantial difference between them; but,
as we are not aided by a brief from the appellee, and as the third
paragraph presents the question in a clearer light than the others,
we confine our investigation and decision to that paragraph. The
material averments of this paragraph, exhibited in acondensed form,
are these: On the eighteenth day of September 1879, the appellee
filed her complaint in the Jennings Circuit Court against the appellant, and in the action thus begun the appellee recovered judgment
for $80 at the March term, 1880. This judgment remains in full
force. The complaint in that action stated as a cause of action the
injuries to the same property from the same negligent and unskilful
improvement of the same street as that described and charged in the
present action. The appellant has made no other improvement
than the one described in the former complaint, and the injuries
resulting to appellee's property were such only as were caused by
the improvement made prior to the filing of the complaint in the
action begun in September 1879. The concluding averment of
the answer is this: '"Andit is the grading of the same street, and the
building of the same culverts, and the identical negligence and want
of care and skill now complained of, that was complained of in the
former action, and no other."
The answer presents a question of great importance and much
difficulty. The theory of the appellee, as we infer from the record,
is that the former action embraced only such damages to the real
estate as occurred prior to the recovery of the judgment in that
action. The theory of the appellant is that the former action
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embraced all damages resulting to the appellees property from the
negligent improvement of the street, and that a second action cannot
be maintained for the same breach of duty that formed the basis of
the first action. There is a material distinction between damages
and injury. Injury is the wrongful act or tort which causes loss or
harm to another. Damages are allowed as an indemnity to the person who suffers loss or harm from the injury. The word "injury"
denotes the illegal act; the term "damages" means the sum recoverable as amends for the wrong. The words are sometimes used as
synonymous terms, but they are, in strictness, words of widely diffeient meaning. There is more than a mere verbal difference in
their meaning, for they describe essentially different things. The
law has always recognised a difference between the things described,
for it is often declared that no action will lie because the act is
damnum a6sqwe inJura.- Brown Leg. Max. 195; Weeks Dam.
Inj. 7 ; Brown Oomm. (4th ed.) 75,621. In every valid cause of
action two elements must be present, the injury and the damages.
The one isthe legal wrong which, is to. be redressed; the other, the
scale or measure of the recovery. Mayne Dam. 1; 1 Sutth. Dam.
8. As there may be.damages without an injury, sa there may be
aa injury without damages. It has been many times said that no
action will lie hecause the injury produced no damages, or, as the law
phrase runs, the wrong is injuria sine damns. The distinction
between injury and damages is an important one in this instance,
and for this reason we have been careful to mark the difference and
to enforce our statement hy reference to authorities, although the
principle involved is a rudimentary one. The distinction is important, for the reason that the law is that fresh damages without a fresh
injury will not authorize a second or subsequent action. The rule
is thus tersely stated in Warner v. Bacon, 8 Gray 39T: " A freshaction cannot be brought unless there be both a new unlawful act
and fresh damage." The rule is illustrated by many cases. Mr.
Mayne refers to the case of RoweZl v. Young, 5 Barn. & 0. 259,
and commenting on it, says : "The statute of limitations runs from
the act of negligence, not from the time an injury accrues. Such
injury is merely a consequential damage, not a fresh cause of action.
The damages, then, in the original action must cover all the loss
that can ever arise, because no such loss can afterwards be compensated." Mayne Dam. 611. An American author says: "A cause
of action and the damages recoverable therefor are an entirety. The
VOL. XXXIV.-14
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party injured must be plaintiff, by the common law, and he must
demand all the damages which he has suffered or ever will suffer
from the injury, grievance, or cause of action, upon which his action
is founded. He cannot split a cause of action and bring successive
suits for parts because he may not be able to prove at first all the
items of the demand, or because all of the damages have not been
suffered." 1 Suth. Dam. 175. The rule we are discussing applies
to cases of personal injuries, for, among the earliest of the reported
cases, we find it laid down for law that in an action for trespass to
the person the recovery of damages must be once for all, including
past as well as prospective damages. Petter v. Beale, 1 Salk. 11 ;
s. c. 1 Ld. Raym. 339. In ffodsoll v. ,tallebrass, 39 E. 0. L. 301,
it was held that both injury and damage must concur to give a cause
of action ; that the damages were not the sole cause of action ; and
the jury were directed to assess both present and prospective damages, because a second action could not be brought for damages
resulting from the same injury.
Upon this ancient doctrine rest th e cases which hold that where
personal injuries are received from the negligent act of a carrier of
passengers, or are caused by the negligence of a municipal corporation, all the damages, present and prospective, must be assessed in
one action, because a second action cannot be brought.. Town of
Elkhart v. Bitter, 66 Ind. 136 ; Weisenberg v. City of Appleton,
26 Wis. 56; Whitney v. Clarendon,18 Vt. 252; s. c. 46 Amer.
Dec. 150; 1 Suth. Dam. 197, authorities in note, p. 198. MrMayne, in discussing this general subject, says: "Similar questions
often arise in cases where a person, by. digging, mining, building,
or the like, affiects the plaintiff's house in such a, manner as- to produce injurious consequences which manifest themselves at a later
period. Here it is now well settled that all subsequent or recurring
damages may be assessed, and can only be recovered in a suit brought
upon the original cause of action." Mayne Dam. 138. In Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503, the doctrine declared by the
author from whom we have quoted is asserted. There is, however,
a later English case which seems to break in upon the rule of the
earlier cases, and to shake, in some degree at least, their authority.
It does, indeed, expressly overrule the case of lamb v. Walker, 3
Q. B. Div. 389. The case to which we refer is Mitchell v. Darley
Main Colliery Co., 24 Amer. Law Reg. 432. If that case can be
regarded as well decided, it must be deemed an exception to the
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general rule, for the general rule is that one action, and one only,
can be maintained for a breach: of duty constituting a tort. The
English court seems to have gone still further in opposition to the
ancient rule in Brunsden v. Humphrey, 2,t Amer. Law Reg. 369;
but in that case Chief Justice COLERIDGE dissented, and an able
reviewer says: "It certainly seems that the reasoning of COLERIDGE, C. J., is more in harmony with the established rule of law.
And it should be noted that the opinion of POLLOCK, B., and LOPES,
J.,in the court below (11 Q. B. Div. 712), were on the same side,
so that really the majority of the judges who have expressed opinions on the subject are against successive actions in such cases."
Id. 378. These English cases may, however, be distinguished from
this case the improvement of the
the one we are discussing, for, in.
street was a permanent one, while in the only one of these English
cases that is analogous to the present, the act out of which the wrong
arose was of a different character.
The case before us is closely analogous to the seizure of land
under the right of eminent domain for railroad or highway purposes, and in all such cases it is held, both by the English and the
American courts, that. all the damages, present and prospective,
must be assessed in one proceeding: Lafayette, ft-, Co. v. New
Albany, ft., Co., 13 Ind- 90 ; Alontgomery, &c., 0o. v. Stockton,
43 Id. 328; 1 Suth. Dam. 191- In the case of Powers v. Council
Bluffs, 45 Iowa 652 ; S. C. 24 Amer. Rep. 792, the city cut a ditch
along the side of plaintiff's lot and caused his land to be overflowed,
and it was declared that the cause of action was complete when- the
unlawful act was committed, and that all the damages accruing from
the original wrong must be included in one action. It is true that
this case has been criticised, but the criticism does not affect its
force upon the point to which we cite it: Wood St. Lim. 372. The
criticism upon the case is that the court erred in holding that the
cause of action accrued when the ditch was dug, for the reason that
no damages at all accrued until some time after the ditch was dug,
and until the damages did accrue there was no complete cause
of action. Conceding, but not deciding, that the criticism is just,
it does not break the force of the decision as applied to this case;
for here there were both damages and injury before the first action
was commenced, and Mr. Wood concedes, or rather affirms, that
if the element of damages had been present in the case cited the
decision would be right. In Town of Troy v. Cheshire Ed., 23
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N. H. 83, it was held that, "in case for nuisance, if the act done
is necessarily injurious and is of a permanent character, the party
injured may at once recover his damages for the whole injury." In
that case the injury to the town was done by the construction of a
railroad, and the court said: "The injury done to the town is, then,
a permanent injury, at once done by the construction of the railroad, which is dependent upon no contingency of which the law
can take notice, and for the injury thus done they are entitled to
recover at once their reasonable damages." It is true, in the
present case, as it was in the one referred to, that the improvement
of the street was a permanent one, and, as it was permanent, the
cause of action was complete when damages resulted, and the recovery must be, not for part of the damages, or for some damages,
but for all the damages resulting from the wrong which constituted
the cause of action. Turning to a somewhat different line of cases,
we find running through them all the same general principles found
in the cases we have cited. Thus, in actions against an attorney
for negligence, the rule is that all loss resulting from the wrong
must be recovered in one action, and no subsequent action can be
maintained; Wilcox v. Plummer's Bz'rs, 4 Pet. 172; Moore v.
Juvenal, 92 Penn. St. 484; Campbell's Adm'rs v. Boggs, 48 Id.
524; Downing v. aarard,24 Id. 52; Miller v. 'Wilson, Id. 114;
Owen v. Western Saving Fund, 97 Id. .47; s. c. 39 Amer. Rep.
794; Howell v. Young, 5 Barn. & C. 259.
In Owen v. Weetern Saving -Fund,supra, the last case cited was
approved, and it was said of it: "And in this case it was held that
special damages resulting from a breach of duty do not constitute
a fresh ground of action, but are merely the measure of the injury
resulting from the original cause." The general principle we are
discussing was involved in the case of Richardson v. .Eagle Machine
Works, 78 Ind. 422, where it was held that an agent who elected
to bring an action for wages could not bring a second action to
recover damages for a breach of the contract stipulating that the
employment should continue for one year. In Crosby y. Jeroloman,
37 Ind. 264, the court quoted with approval from the opinion in
Secor v. Sturgis, 16 N. Y. 548, the following: "I admit that the
rule does not extend to several and distinct trespasses or other
wrongs, nor, as we have seen, to distinct contracts. It goes against
several actions for the same wrong and against several actions on
the same contract." The general rule, as stated by a recent
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author, is this: "When a wrong is done which produces an injury
which is not only immediate, but from its nature must necessarily
continue to produce loss independent of any subsequent wrongful
acts, then all the damages resulting, both before and after the commencement of the suit, may be estimated and recovered in one
action :" 3 Suth. Dam. 403. In Adams v-. lastings, fc., Co., I8
Minn. 265 (Gil. 236), this rule was enforced. The court, speaking
of the construction of a railroad, said: "And if such erection
necessarily caused the surface water to stand upon the plaintiff's
land and run into his cellar and well, he could recover therefor in
the same action, though such injury might not accrue for some time
after the completion of the road-bed and track." This general
principle is also maintained in Seely v. Aldern, 61 Penn. St. 302.
There are many cases declaring and enforcing the general rule
that the plaintiff may recover in one action all the damages he suffers, whether retrospective or prospective. where the injury which
causes the loss or harm is of a permanent character, as a street, a
canal, or a railroad. All things that proximately contribute to the
injury may be taken into consideration in estimating the damages,
and if the injury extends so far as to totally destroy the value of
the property, then damages equal to the value of the property may
be awarded. Mr. Freeman states the rule very strongly. His
statement is this: "All the damages which can by any possibility
result from a single tort form an indivisible cause of action." - He
also says: "For damages alone no action can be permitted. Hence,
if a recovery has once been had for the unlawful act, no subsequent
suit can be sustained :" Freem. Judgm., § 241. The cases of (Jadle
v. Afuseatine W. B. Co., 44 Iowa 11 ; Finley v. llershey, 41 Id.
389 ; Illinois Cent. Rd. CJo. v. Grabill,50 Ill. 241 ; -Elizabethtown,
&e., Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush 382; Jeffersonville, &c., Co. v. wtelle,
13 Id. 667, illustrate and enforce the principles we are discussing.
In Fowle v. New Haven, &c., Co., 112 Mass. 334, language is used
which so forcibly applies here that we quote it: "The case at bar,"
said the court, "is not to be treated strictly in this respect as an
action for an abatable nuisance. More accurately, it is an action
against the defendant for .the construction of a public work under
its charter in such a manner as to cause unnecessary damage by
want of proper care and skill in its construction. For such an
injury the remedy is at common law. And if it results from
a cause which is permanent in its character, or which is treated as
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permanent by the parties, it is proper that entire damages should
be assessed with reference to past and probable future injury."
As probable future damages may be taken into consideration in
an action to recover for a loss caused by the negligence of corporate
officers in constructing a public work of a permanent character, the
plaintiff in such an action can recover all the damages he has sustained, and in all such cases no second action. can be maintained.
To permit a second action to recover damages resulting from the
negligent grading of a street, would be to allow successive damages
to be awarded where there was no fresh wrong. Great injustice
would almost inevitably result from a rule permitting successive
actions, for it would be impossible to prevent damages from being
twice assessed for the same wrong.
The ultimate conclusions to which these authorities lead are:
First. That'where there is one cause of action all the damages
must be recovered in one suit, and for fresh damages resulting from
the original wrong a second action cannot be maintained. Second.
Where the cause of action is the negligence and unskilfulness of
the officers of a municipal corporation in the improvement of a
street, the injury is complete and permanent, constituting but one
cause of action; and in a suit on that cause of action all damages,
present and prospective, may be recovered, and for fresh damages
resulting from the improvement a second action will not lie.
The complaint of the appellee, as we have seen, is based upon the
negligence of the corporate officers in improving a street and the
improvement is a permanent one, so that the tort which formed
the basis of the action was complete when damages resulted.
The answer avers, and the demurrer admits, that there was no
new wrong or negligence. As the pleadings stand, there is a single wrong, and nothing more. The fresh damages do not, as the
pleadings aver, arise from a new or fresh wrong.. The case, therefore, is not within the authorities which hold that where there is a
new neglect or a fresh wrong there may be a second action.
The answer avers that the injury complained of is the same as
that declared on in the former action. It goes even further, for it
affirmatively shows that no improvement has been made, and that
no grading has been done since that described in the former complaint. The causes of action are therefore the same. Where the
answer avers the causes of action to be the same, and the record
does not show them to be different, the averment is taken to be true
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on demurrer: Cutlerv. Cox, 2 Blackf. 178. If the causes of action
are not the same, that fact must be replied: James v. State, 7
Blackf. 326.
We have upon the pleadings, therefore, a case where there are
fresh damages, but where there is no fresh cause of action; for the
utmost that can be yielded to the appellee is that the record shows
that damages have resulted since the first action, flowing, however,
from the original wrong. We need not decide what might be successfully replied; we simply decide the question before us, and our
decision is, that the answer sufficiently pleads a former adjudication.
We have already placed stress upon the fact that the construction
of the highway is permanent, and that the wrong was complete
when the street, as a permanent work, was finished and damages
resulted. We deem it proper to emphasize this element of the case,
for we can readily conceive cases of an essentially different character
where a very different rule would apply. We can conceive of cases
where a temporary wrong might be done under such circumstances
as would make it reasonable to presume that the defendant would
right the wrong before a recurrence of harm or loss, and in such
-cases it might well be that the plaintiff could bring a second- action.
We know that there are cases where it is proper to presume that
the wrongdoer will not maintain- the unlawful thing that caused the
harm or loss : Mayne Dam. 141, § 110.
But the case upon which w-e are pronouncing judgment, and to
which we confine our decision, is one where the improvement of the
street was a complete. and permanent fact, and where the parties
must presume that it was permanent in its character, and that it
was intended that the thing done should remain unchanged. It
cannot be presumed that municipal officers, having built a street or
road, intended it to be temporary. A presumption that the wrong
was not of a permanent character might, perhaps, obtain where a
natural watercourse is temporarily obstructed, or where, in the
course of improving a street, water was thrown upon a lot; but it
cannot prevail where the improvement of the street is complete and
the street permanently .constructed. This is not the case of a
nuisance. It is the case of a negligent improvement of a street.
The improvement was in itself rightful and legal but the manner
in which the improvement was made was wrongful. The wrong
was not in grading the street, but in the manner of doing it. It is
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not a nuisance for a municipal corporation to grade its streets, but
it is an actionable wrong to do it negligently. The wrong in negligently grading the street is the basis of the action, for there are no
facts alleged constituting a nuisance. It is not a nuisance to do
what the law authorizes, but it may be a tort to do the authorized
act in a negligent manner. It is evident, therefore, that the cases
which hold that the continuance of a nuisance will supply ground
for an action have no influence upon this case.
Judgment reversed.
I. The authorities are so fully cited
upon the first branch of the principal
case, that any further citations upon the
well-settled principles there announced
would be useless. All the cases agree
upon them, and it is only in this application that differences arise. We proceed
to a consideration of the second branch
of the case.
2. It is elementary that there can be
no recovery of damages sustained, unless
there was an injury which caused the
damages sought to be recovered, or from
which the damage directly or proximately
flowed. Before the complaining party
can recover he must show an injury done
to him, either to his person, property or
rights ; and then the law will recompense
him by couipelling the party in the wrong
to pay him a sum of money, supposed to
The
be commensurate with his loss.
word "injury" for which damages are
allowed is such an one as the law recognises, a "legal injury ;" and a right to
recover damages is a "legal right."
Wherever it is said there is no "right"
without a remedy, a "right," such as the
law recognises, is meant; for there are
many rights for the deprivation of which
the law gives no remedy: Cooley on
Torts 19.
In the nature of things, as well as in
law, damage and injury are inseparable:
without a damage there is no injury, and
an injury necessarily draws with it a
damage. Yet there are, in many instances, damages suffered as to which in
law the fiction is adopted that they arise

without an injury, or are damnum absque
injuria. For these no action lies : Broom
Max. 19.5 ; Hall v. Mayor of Bristol,L.
R., 2 0. P. 322 ; Snith v. narkerah,
L. R., I C. P.. 564; 1 Smith L. C.
361.
From-this rule that every damage for
which a recovery is allowed, has its corresponding injury, arises another rule
that for every new or fresh damage sustained, there must be a corresponding
new and fresh injury; and if there has
been a recovery had for the injury inflicted, a second recovery for a new and fresh
damage sustained since judgment pronounced cannot be had, because there is
no corresponding injury. If the fresh
damage accrued before trial had, evidence
of it may be given so that the jury may
more accurately measure the quantum of
damages to he awarded: filer v. N. Y..
Cent. Rd. Co., 49 N. Y. 42; Haganv.
l~ey, 13 Gray 515 ; Hayden v. Albee,
20 Minn. 159 ; lort v. Union P. Rd.
Co., 2 Dill. 259 ; Hogan v. Riley, 13 Gray
515. But where a judgment intervenes
between the injury a;id the subsequent
development of fresh damages, no cause
of action can be maintained on account
of these damages. Two reasons are assigned for this: First, there is no fresh
injury, and the injured party has already
recovered for the injury inflicted; second,'the injury being permanent, or of
some duration, the jury were authorized
to award prospective, as well as past
damages, and it is conclusively presumed
that they did award both classes of
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damages. Weisenberg v. City of Appleton, 2& Wis. 56; Town of Elkhart v.
Ritter, 66 Ind. 136; City o0 Indianapolis
Y. Gaston, 58 Id. 224; Millerv. Wilson,
24 Penn. St. 114; Howell v. Young, 5
B. & C. 259.
But if the fresh damages arose from
new injuries, perpetrated after the commencement of the action, then evidence
of such fresh damages cannot he given ;
for a new action must be brought to recover them: Hicks v. fferrinq, 17 Cal.
566; Troy v. Cheshire Rd. Co., 23 N.
H. 102 ; Phillip7v. Terry, 3 Keyes 313;
Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1086.
That no action can be maintained for
damages developed after verdict, and of
which both the plaintiff and defendant
and which could not be
were ignora,
foretold by himan science or ingenuity,
is certainly a harsh rule, and one not calculated to inspire the moralist with a profound admiration of the law. It is true
that the maxim interest reipubliem ut sit
finfs litiunn (Broom's Max.. 331), is here
insisted upon ; but maxims often work
an injury rather than afford a redress for
grievances. Thus, where money was
paid, and a receipt taken which wa lost,
and the payer was by suit compelled to
pay a second time ; and afterwards finding the receipt, the payer brought suit
for the money had and received, as to the
last amount paid, it was-held that no recovery could be had, and the doctrine of
the maxim quoted was invoked toprevent
a recovery: Ilarriot v. Hampton, 7 T.
I. 269 ; see Follett v. Hoppe, 5 C. B.
238; Smith v. Afonteih, 13 M. & W.
427; Hoinlet v. Richardson, 9 Bing. 644.
Modern legislation has often afforded relief in such instances, by providing for a
new trial on account of newly discovered
evidence.
The larshness of the ruleinsisted upon
and applied in the principal case, evidently led the English court in Milchll
v. Dartey 1ain Colliery Co., 24 Am.
Law Reg. (N. S.) 432, and note, to
parry its thru-t and raise a distinction in
VOL. XXXIV.- 5

the cases, largely, if not in fact artificial.
In the principal case it was the subsequent- flooding'that caused the damages ;
in the English case it was the subsequent
subsidence that caused them. In the
latter case it was held that there was a
continuing duty imposed by law upon the
defendant to keep the walls and roof of
the mine propped, so that there would
not be a fresh subsidence. Why was
there not a continuing duty devolving
upon the city to keep her streets-her
property-in such a condition, that it
would not cause a new damage? Damages lad been allowed because the grading of the street had cast water upon the
plaintiff's lot ; and the subsequent suit
was for a damage identical in its. results.
If suit had been brought before any damage was suffered, no verdict for the
plaintiff, no doubt, could have been
given. It is argued that the street improvement was permanent, and that such
damage must, in the nature of things,
again occur ; and therefore the jury have
awarded prospective damages. The same
argument is applicable to the colliery
case. In neither instance could the jury
anticipate all the damages that would
afterwards arise. If the plaintiff should
wait a long time until he was sure he
could lay before the jury evidence of all
the damages he had sustained, he would
probably be met with the plea of the
statute of limitations: Woodsworth v.
Harley, I B. & Ad. 391 ; Roberts v.
Read, 16 East 215.
The ease of Brunsden v. Humphrey.
24 Am. Law Reg. (N. S.) 369, and
note, goes a step farther than the colliery case. The plaintiff's van was injured by the defendant's van, and lie
recovered damages therefor. Afterwards
he sued for damages to his person, caused
by some collision, and was allowed to recover. Lord COLERIDGE dissented, !aying, "It seems to me a subtlety not warranted by law, to hold that a man cannot
bring two actions, if lie is injured in his
arm and in his leg, but can bring two
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actions, if besides his arm and leg being
injured, his trousers, which contain his
leg, and his coat-sleeve, which contains
his arm, have been torn."
Suppose the
injured person had borrowed the trousers
and coat, could not the owner have
maintained an action for the injury to
them, and the injured person for his personal injuries ? Undoubtedly; aid if
two actions could thus be maintained by
different persons, why not allow one person to bring them ?
The doctrine of these two cases will,
no doubt, find its place in our jurisprudence, although courts may not be willing to recognise it under the name it is
here known ; just as they constantly
reiterate that a new trial will not be
granted for impeaching or cumulative
evidence, and yet seek to distinguish the
newly discovered evidence produced from
that charge in order that justice may be
done.
But how are the cases ? For an injury
to his person by reason of a defective
sidewalk, the plaintiff has but one action ; in it he recovers past and prospective damages: Leroy v. Springfleld, 81
IlL 114; see Crawford v. Gaulden, 33
Ga. 173. And the same is true of injuries received in a railroad accident;
and if the person does not recover for a
long time, and delays suit until he can
ascertain the amount of his damages,
until the period of the statute of limitation has run from the time of the injury,
his right of action will be barred : Piller v. Southern Pacific Rd. Co., 52 Cal.
42 ; Gustin v. .6efferson, 15 Ia. 158.
So where an attorney-at-law neglected
to prosecute a claim until it became
barred at law, and he was neither guilty
of fraud or concealment, it was held, in
lin action against him for damages, alleging special consequential damages, thatthe
statute began to run in his favor, from
the time of the breach of duty, although
the special damages were not made definite or revealed until later : Moore v.
Juvenal,92 Penn. St. 484 ; s.c. 39 Am.

Rep. 795; see also Wilcox v. Plunmer,
4 Pet. 172 ; Rhines v. Evans, 66 Penn.
St. 192; s. c. 5 Am. Rep. 364. And
that the plaintiff may recover prospective
damages, and can have only one action
where only one injury is inflicted: see
Donaldson v. Mississippi,4-c., Rd. Co.,
IS Ia. 280; Walker v. Erie Ed. Co., 63
Barb. 260; Penn. Rd. Co. v. Books, 57
Penn. 339; Aaron v. Secoud Avenue Rd.
Co., 2 Daly 127 ; Drewv. Sixth Avenue
Rd. Co., 26 N. Y. 49 ; .Filer v. N. Y.
Cent. Rd. Co., 49 Id. 42; Holyoke v.
Grand Trunk Rd. Co., 48 N. H. 541 ;
Blackv. Carrollton Rd. Co., 10 La. Ann.
33;

-l-ink v.

Schroyer, 18 Ill. 416;

Matteson v. N. Y., J-c., Rd. Co., 62
Barb. 364 ; Klein v. Jewett, 26 N. J.
Eq. 474; Caldwell v. Murphy, I Duer

233; Memphis, 4-c., Rd. Co. v. Whitfield, 44 Miss. 466; Curtis v. Rochester, d-c.. Rd. Co., 18 N. Y. 534.
Where a father brought suit for an injury to his child, and the suit was limited
to the injury up to the time of bringing
the action, it was held that a second suit
for loss of service, arising by reason of
injurious effects of the first injury, after
the suit, could not be maintained : Whitney v. Clarendon, 18 Vt. 252; see Waller v. Chicago, 11 Ill. App. 209.
When property is taken for public use,
or by a railroad or other corporation, the
damages assessed must include future or
prospective damage; and no second action can be brought, or writ of assessment
obtained for damages afterwards sustained: Perley v. B. C. 4- M. Rd. Co.,
57 N. H. 212 ; Waterman v. Connecticut
Rd. Co., 30 Vt. 610; Water Co. v.
Chambers, 13 N. J. Eq. 199; Van
Schoick v. Delaware Canal, 20 N. J. L.
249 ; Fowle v. New Haven Co., 112
Mass. 334 ; Ibwle v. N. H., 4-c., Rd.
Co., 107 Id. 352 ; Aldrichv. Cheshire Rd.
Co., 21 N. H. 359 ; Sawyer v. Keene,
47 Id. 173 ; Chesapeake Canaly. Grove,
II Gill &J. 391 : Call v. Middlesex, 2
Gray 232; Bake" v. Johnson, 2 Hill
342; Evans v. Haefer, 29 Mo. 141;
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Montmorency G. Rd. Co. v. Stockton, 43
Ind. 328 ; La Fayette Rd. Co. v. New
Albany, 13 Id. 90; Missouri Ed. Co. v.
Haines, 10 Kan. 439 ; Baltimore Rd. Co.
v. Magruder, 34 Md- 79; Furniss v.
Hudson Rd. Go., 5 Sandf. 551.
So an assessment for damages for land
taken to widen a road, includcs all damages occasioned by reducing the land so
taken to the grade of such road, and consequently, where the grade of such road
was subsequently changed, the damage
occasioned by such change were held not
to include any but such as arose by the
alteration of the road in its entire width
from the old established grade to the new
grade : Van Riper v. Essex PabliaBoard,
9 V'room 23.
But in the case of a continuing nuisance, a recovery is allowed up to the
date of the writ ; and for its continuance
after that time, a new action lies ; for
every continuance of the nuisance is a
new nuisance : Cole v. Sprowl, 35 Me.
161 ; ;edder v. Vedder, I Denio 257;
Bare v. Hoffman, 79 Penn. St. 71;
Savannah, 4-c., Rd. Ca. v. Bourquin, 51
Ga. 378; Slight v. Gutzaff 35 Wis.
675 ; Queen v. Waterhouse, L. R., 7 Q,
B. 545 ; Thayer v. Brooks, 17 Ohio
489 ; Anderson, Sc., Rd. Co. v. Kernodle, 65 Md. 314; Hoph s v. Western
.PacificRd. Co., 50 Cal. 190; Frendenstein v. Heine, 6 Mo. App. 287 ; Allen
v. Worthy, L. R., 5 Q. B. 163; Bradley v. Amis, 2 Hayw. 399. It is otherwise if the wrongful act prnduced an injury which is not only immediate, but
froni its nature must necessarily continue

to produce loss independent of any subsequent wrongful act; then all the damage resulting, botl- before and, after the
commencement of the suit, may be estimated and recovered in one action:
Cooper v. Randall, 59 Ill. 321 ; Hayden
v. Albee, 20 Minn. 159 ; Adams v. Hastings, 6-c., Rd. Co., 18 Id. 265 ; Troy v.
Cheshire Rd. Co., 23 N. H. 102; O'Riley T. McChesney, 3 Scam. 278 ; affirmed,
49 N. Y. 672 ; Seely v. Alden, 61 Penn.
St. 302; Cumberland, 6c., Co. v. Hitchings, 65 Me. 140 ; Elizabethtown, 6-c.,
Rd. Co. v. Combs, 10 Bush 382; see
Cadle v. Muscatine, &-c., Rd. Co., 44 Ia.
11; Simpson v. Keokuk, 34 Id. 568.
In ar action for enticing away an apprentice, damage does not include the
loss of services for the residue of his
term to come after the trial, for the apprentice may return: Hambleton v.
Veerer 2 Saund. L70; Moore v. Love, 3
Jones L. 215; Trigg v. Northcut, Litt.
Sc. Cas. 414; Hodsollv. Steltebrase, 11
A. & E. 301 ; Lewfs v. Paachey, I H. &
C. 518 ; see KcKoy v. Bryson, S Ired.
L. 216. And this is true even though
the apprentice enlist in the public service,
or in the army or navy: Covert v. Gray,
34 How. Pr. 450.
And where-the defendant enticed away
the plaintiff's wife, it was held that recovery would be had only up to the time
of bringing the action ; for the detention
after that time a new action could be
maintained : Brasfidd v. Lee, 1 Ld.
Raym. 329.
W. W. THORNTON.
Crawfordsville.

Supreme Court of Missouri.
BENT, RECEIVER ST. LOUIS MUTUAL INS. CO., v. PRIEST.
Where a director receives propefty as an inducement of and consideration for his
vote and influence in a proposed contract with the corporation, lie is a trustee of
such property, and it may be recovered from him in a suit by a receiver of the corporation.
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In constructive trusts arising from fraud, if the facts constituting the fraud are
open, the statute of limitations commences to run at once ; but if the facts are secret
the statute does not commence to run until their discovery.
The fact that a suit is being prosecuted under a champertous agreement between
plaintiff and his counsel is no defence to the suit. Such irregularitycan only be set
up when it is sought to enforce the champertous agreement.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
BLACK, J.-In 1873 the superintendent of insurance began
proceedings to wind up the St. Louis Mutual Life Ins. Co., which
was not then in a satisfactory condition. Most of the directors
regarded a reinsurance as the best way out of the difficulty.
Efforts were made to that end, including negotiations with the
Mound City Life Ins. Co. Charles H_ Peck, who was a large
stockholder in the St. Louis Mutual, but not a director or officer,
made proposals to some of the officers of the Mound City to bring
about such an arrangement, the result of which was -a contract
between Peck and the president of that company, dated 27th
November 1873, by which, after reciting the desire of that company
to effect the reinsurance, and the deemed necessity of Peck's services to accomplish that object, the company agreed to pay him
$155,000 within sixty days, for which sum Peck was to "devote
his services for the procurement of such reinsurance and effecting a
contract between said companies. Peck thereupon approached the
defendant, a director of the St. Louis Mutual, who at first did not
take much interest in the matter. Peck then in substance stated
that he was largely interested in having the reinsurance effected;
that it was worth ten or fifteen thousand dollars to the stockholders
of St. Louis Mutual, and that he meant business.
Priest and Wyman were partners in the real estate business, and
upon Peck's suggestion that his business was legitimately within
the partnership business, Priest referred Peck to Wyman, who was
at a desk in the same room or office. The result of the negotiation
between Peck and Wyman was that the former placed bonds of the
L. & N. Railroad Co., of the par value of $15,000, in the hands
of Mullikin to be handed to Wyman if the reinsurance.was effected,
otherwise they were to be returned to Peck. This agreement was
in writing, but was subsequently destroyed. The evidence, including a letter from Peck, shows that he agreed within thirty days
to substitute money, or bonds of the Vulcan Iron Co. or St. Louis
Gas Co. for these railroad bonds, the latter it is said then being
worth but sixty cents on the dollar.
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As the Mound City Ins. Co. then stood the superintendent of
insurance- did not regard it strong enough to make the reinsurance and
it was required to add a half million. dollars to- its capital stock.
In December 1873, a contract of reinsurance was made by the St.
Louis Mutual with the Mound City, the latter also stipulating that
for a transfer of all of the assets of the St. Louis Mutual, it would
assume all the liabilities of that company, increase its own stock a
half a million dollars, and out of this increased stock exchange its
own stock for that of the St. Louis Mutual.
Of the twenty directors of the St. Louis Mutual, seventeen,
including the defendant, voted for the measure.
The Mound City increased its stock as agreed, the reinsurance
was approved by the superintendent of insurance and by the court
in which the proceedings against the Mound City were-pending, and
those proceedings were dismissed.
By the 17th Jam 1874 the whole contract was substantially completed, Peck received his agreed compensation from the Mound City
Ins. Co. in secured notes, which ihat company acquired by the assignment from the St. Louis Mutual, Peek would not, at least did not,
substitute money or bonds of the Iron Co. or Gas Co. as he had
agreed for the railroad bonds in the hands of Mullikin, and Wyman,
unable to do better, took those bonds.
In August 1874, Priest and Wyman dissolved their partnership,
at which time Wyman handed over to Priest the one-half of the
railroad bonds.
The conclusion from all the evidence is irresistible that defendant
agreed to and did advocate and vote for the assignment and reinsurance, in consideration of the arrangement between Peck and
Wyman. At all events the bonds were given to secure defendant's
active influence in favor of the measure, though without this he
might not have been hostile to the transaction.
In 1877 the superintendent of insurance commenced new proceedings against the St. Louis Mut. Life Ins. Co., and plaintiff was
appointed receiver. By this suit he seeks to charge the defendant
as a trustee of all the railroad bonds. The Circuit Court so held
and decreed as to the on*e-half received by the defendant, and on
his refusal to produce the same, entered a money judgment for the
estimated value.
From this judgment the defendant appealed. Plaintiff took a
writ of error. In like manner both parties come to this court from
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the Court of Appeals, where the judgment of the Circuit Court was
affirmed.
An agent or trustee cannot unite in himself the opposite character of buyer and seller, and if he does the profits may be charged
with a trust for the benefit of the principal, unless the latter confirm
the transaction with full knowledge of all of the facts. So too if
the agent make gains from the use of the trust funds or property
he must account therefor. We need not cite authorities from this
and other courts to support these plain propositions. Again, if the
agent accepts any benefits in conducting the business of his principal
he will hold them in trust for the principal : Story on Agency, sect.
211 (8th ed.); Perry on Trusts, sect. 206; Jacobus v. Mason, 37
N. J. Eq. 48.
The directors of a corporation occupy a fiduciary position. They
are trustees and agents of the corporation and stockholders. In
general they are governed by the same rules as are applied to trustees and agents. Parker v. Nickerson, 112 Mass. 195; By. Co.
v. Poor, 59 Me. 277; Byi. Co. v. Rudson, 19 Eng. L. & Eq. 365.
In Perry on Trusts, at sect. 207, it is said: "And so all advantages,
all purchases, all sales,, and all sums of money received by directors
in dealing with the property of the corporation, are made -and
received by them as trustees of the corporation, and they must
account for all such moneys or advantages received by them by reason of their position as trustees." Defendant does not seriously
controvert these general principles of equity jurisprudence, but he
insists they have no rightful application to this case, because the
bonds were never a part of the assets of the St. Louis Mutual, did
not constitute a part of the consideration, avowed or concealed, paid
by the Mound City, and were not made by him in the legitimate
business of the corporation.
He relies with full confidence upon. Tyrrell v. Bank of London
10 H. L. C. 26. The substantial facts of that case were these:
The bank had been recently organized, and Tyrrell was itasolicitor.
Mrs. Campbell owned certain property upon a part. of which was
situated a building known as the Hall of Commerce. Read had a
contract with her for the purchase of the whole property at 49,2001.
Tyrrell and Read formed a combination to sell the property to the
bank at an advance price, and Tyrrell, for his influence, was to have
a one-half interest in the contract which Read had with Mrs Campbell. Tyrrell kept the agreement secret from the bank, at the same
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time urged the bank to purchase, professing to act for it as solicitor.
Eventually the bank purchased the Hall of Commerce part of the property at 65,000t Out of this Mrs. Campbell was paid, some lItigated claims were-settled, and the balance was pai- to Read, who
divided the profits with Tyrrell, each making some 60001., and had
left also the unsold portion of the property, alleged to be of thevalue
of 80001.
The suit was brought by the bank against Tyrrell and Read.
The Master of the Rolls dismissed the bill as to Read and decreed
Tyrrell a trustee for the bank of all interests acquired in the property. Accounts were directed to be taken, and Tyrrell was ordered
to convey to the bank his share in the property not sold to the
bank. On appeal prosecuted by Tyrrell, the decree was modified
in form. The Lords considered- that Tyrrell could not be decreed a,
trustee of the unsold portion of the property, and should not have
been directed to- convey that to the bank, because as was said, the
limit of the agency of Tyrrell, the extent of his obligation and the
relation of solicitor and clieit, were to be ascertained by the extent
of the property sold by Tyrrell to the bank. The Lord Chancellor
very clearly states that Tyrrell could only be a trustee as to that
portion of the property sold to the bank, and as to that he should
make no gain. le proceeds to say the object which the Master of
the Rolls had in view is to be accomplished in another way: "Tyrrell
must receive from his clients, in his character of vendor to his clients,
only that sum of money which, as between him and Read, Tyrrell
must be taken to have paid for the property conveyed to his clients;
but that sum of money must be ascertained in the following way:
By deducting from it the value of the unsold property included in
the contract between Read and Tyrrell, but not included in the
contract of sale to the clients."
The bank among other things contended, that assuming Tyrrell's
agency as to the bank was confined to the Hall of Commerce part
of the property, still the circumstances showyed that he received the
share in the rest as a bribe, and for that reason the bank was entitled to a conveyance of it. As to this contention, Lord CHELMSFORD said: "lNo authority has been adduced in support of such a
proposition, and I do not think it can be maintained. In order to
simplify the question, lei it be supposed that Tyrrell had acquired
no interest in the property, but that Read had offered him 50001. to
induce the respondent to purchase, and that they had been persuaded
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by Tyrrell to buy at an excessive price. Of course they might
have rescinded the contract, but could they in any manner have
obtained the 50001. on the ground that it belonged to them ? If
by reason of the agreement between Read and Tyrrell, the respondent had been prevailed upon to give too large a sum for the property, they might have maintained an action on the case against both
parties to the imposition upon them, and have recovered damages;
or they might have sued their agent,-Tyrrell, for damages arising
from the breach of duty, and they would probably have received
an amount equal to the sum which he had improperly received as a
fair measure of the injury which they had sustained. But the
50001. itself, as a specific demand, they could in no manner have
recovered. The unsold part of the property in the same manner
cannot be directly reached by any proceeding of the respondent."
These remarks of Lord CHELMSFORD, if detached from the facts of
that case and the decree actually made, appear to give some support
to the defendants' position here.
The solicitor could be regarded as the agent of the bank only so
far as the bank became the purchaser; beyond that he had a right
to deal for himself;- yet the decree as modified did not allow him to
make any gain out of the transaction taken as a whole. He was
allowed to keep the unsold portion, but its value was deducted from
the amount which he was allowed to receive from the clients in the
statement of the account. Practically there was little if any difference between the decree as made by the Master of the Rolls and as
modified, in its effect upon the parties; and this seems to have been
conceded in terms by Lord ORANWORTir. The facts there in judgment and the decree even as modified, do not furnish a precedent in
defendant's favor.
Where a trustee retired from his office in consideration that his
successor paid him a sum of money, it was held that the money so
paid should be treated as a 'part of the trust estate, and be accounted for as such by the refiring trustee, on the ground that he
could make no profit, directly or indirectly, from the .trust propert.v or from his office of trustee-: Suygden v. Crossland, 3 Smale
&.Gif. 192.
In Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Beav. 360, it appears the Eagle Ins.
Co. desired to buy out the business of the London Mutual Ins; Co.,
and agreed to and did pay a specific consideration therefor, and by
a secret agreement with the directors agreed to and did pay to them
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the further sum of four thousand pounds as a compensation for
the loss of their offices. These directors were held to be trustees
for the corporation ; and it was also ruled that they received
that sum by reason of their position as trustees, and must account
therefor.
These cases are all quite clear to the effect that the trustee wilI
not be allowed to make gain to himself beyond his allowed compensation, by reason of his office and influence as such trustee. By
accepting the office the director undertakes to give his judgment
and influence to the interests of the corporation in all matters in
which he represents or professes to represent it. That judgment
and influence of right belongs to the corporation, and so does that
which it produces ; and the bonds received by the director are its
property, as between it and the defendant. The circumstance that
they came from Peck, and not directly from the Mound City Ins.
Co., is wholly immaterial. They came from the agent of that company, and the extravagant amount paid Peck impresses one with
the notion that more ihan fair commissions were included in the
Q155,000. However that may be, what the director makes in his
office as such, belongs to the corporation. It will not do to clog
these principles of law applied to principal and agent, trustee and
cestui que trust, with exceptions and modifications. They must
not be whittled away. Whatever may be the practice in such cases,
the agreement by which the bonds were acquired was an illegal
contract, as well as a plain breach of duty. No court, it is true,
would aid the defendant or the receiver, or the corporation of which
he is the receiver, in recovering the bonds from Peck, for that
would be to execute the illegal contract. Neither would a court
assist Peck in recovering them back after the transaction was completed. So, too, an agent may resist an accounting on the ground
that the subject of the agency was illegal or against public policy:
Story on Agency, sect. 235. But when the subject of the agency
is entirely legal, and that was the case here, and profits are made
by a violation of duty, it would be obviously unjust to allow the
agent to reap the fruits of his own misconduct: Id., sect. 207.
An agent is accountable to his principal for moneys that came into
his hands as such, even if such amount be composed of usurious
interest, and not collectable by the principal himself: Chinn v.
Chinn, 22 La. Ann. 599. One party cannot hold back proceeds
from another of whom lie was representative, on the ground that
Vor,. XXXIV.-16
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there was illegality in the way of getting the money: Whart. on
Contr. sect. 354. The defendant acquired the bonds while acting
and professing to act in his capacity of director, and must be held
to have received them in that capacity. The plaintiff's case is
made out by the proof of these facts, and we are not concerned in
tle execution of the illegal agreement.
As to the writ of error prosecuted by the receiver, we do not
see that he has any right to the bonds which never came to the
defendant. Wyman, who acquired them, is no party to this suit,
held no fiduciary relation to the plaintiff's corporation. The receiver
has elected to take the course here pursued, and must be content
with such property as it will reach.
This suit was begun 19th February 1879, five years and ten
to fifteen days after Wyman received the bonds for himself and
defendant. The agreement by which the bonds were acquired, and
the receipt of the same are facts which were kept secret from all
persons save those directly connected therewith, until 1878.
Rumors were then afloat pointing to these facts. They were then
brought to the attention of the court, soon thereafter this suit was
begun, defendant pleaded the five years statute of limitations, and
plaintiff replied that the fraud was not discovered until within five
years next before the commencement of the suit.
Sect. 3230, R. S., specifies five different classes of civil actions,
(other than those for the recovery of real estate), which can only
be commenced within five years after the cause of action shall have
accrued. The fifth is, "an action for relief on the ground of fraud,
the cause of action in such case to be deemed not to have accrued
until the discovery by the aggrieved party, at any time within ten
years, of the facts constituting the fraud."
Our statute of limitations applies to equitable, as well as legal
causes of action, and we agree with counsel for the defendant that
this clause under consideration, shduld be considered in the light of
the former equity rules, the place of which, in many respects at
least, it was designed to take. Beyond doubt the statute does not
now, and never did run against an express continuing trust in favor
of the trustee; certainly not until he openly repudiates the trust:
Johnson v. Smith, 27 Mo. 591; Smith v. Becards, 52 Id. 581;
56 Id. 553. Conceded it must be, that by the equity 'rules the
statute was not applied by way of analogy in cases of actual fraud
until the discovery of the fraud. But is it true, as is contended
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here, that by those rules the statute was applied without regard to
the time of discovery in case of constructive frauds and trusts ?
It was said by SCOTT, J., in .Heton'sHeirs v. Keeton's Adn'r,
20 Mo. 541, "In cases of resulting implied and constructive trusts,
where a party is to be constituted a trustee by a decree of a court
of equity, founded on. fraud, it is well settled as a rule of equity,
that the statute of limitations and presumptions from lapse of time,
will operate. With regard to the statute of limitations, it will run
from the time that the facts are brought home to the knowledge of
the party." See also Perry on Trusts, sects. 228 and 230; 1. Dan.
Ch.Plead. 669; Hunter v. Hunter, 50 Mo. 445; Angell on Lim.,
sect. 470. In the case last cited the defendants were the uncles
andc agents of the plaintiffs for the management and sale of their
lands; they purchased the lands, with the value of which the
plaintiffs were not familiar, at an under value; they then. sold the
same at an advanced price. It was a suit to establish a constructive trust for the profits arising from the re-sale. It was there
said: "If a party is in possession of, or has notice of, the main
facts constituting the fraud, the statute will commence running
from that time." The difference of opinion expressed in that case
and the subsequent one of Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo. 187, is not
pertinent to any inquiry here, for this case in no way concerns real
estate.
Many authorities do hold that in cases of constructive trusts and
frauds, the statute will begin to run without regard to the time of
the discovery. This appears to be due to the fact that often in
such cases the facts are open, and the law frequently draws its conclusion without regard to the motives, because of the confidential
relation of the parties. Much we think depends upon the fact
whether the fraud is a secret or open one. If the substantial facts
constituting the fraud in cases like the one under consideration
were open, it is believed under the equity rules the statute of limitations would have been applied at once ; but if the facts were in
their nature secret and were unknown, it is believed the statute
would not begin to run until they were discovered, there being no
want of diligence on the part of the complainant. Iere the fraud
consists in professing to act for and in the interest of the corporation, as was defendant's duty, when in reality he was acting for
himself and for his private gain. The agreement under which
this was done was in its very nature a secret one, one which the
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corporation would not naturally suspect, and one which would not
be revealed by any act openly done. Of course here, simple
knowledge of the existence of the agreement and acquisition of
the bonds thereunder, brought home to the plaintiff or the corporation of which he is receiver, would start the statute, and from that
time it would continue to run, notwithstanding the subsequent appointment of the receiver. This knowledge was not acquired until
much more than fifteen days after the receipt of the bonds by
Wyman. The circumstances by which the transaction was discovered show there was no laches on the part of the plaintiff or his
corporation.
We conclude the clause of the statute before noted applies to
this case, and under it the cause of action is not barred.
A contract founded on a champertous consideration is illegal,
against public policy and void: Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 55. In
that case the contract, there in question, was held not to be chainpertous because the attorneys did not bind themselves to pay any
portion of the expenses of the litigation.
Where the right of the plaintiff, which he seeks to enforce, is
derived under a title founded on his champerty, the suit must fail.
Courts are not organized for the purpose of enforcing such contracts.
Many of the authorities cited by defendant go to this extent and no
farther, some of them do appear to hold that where there is a champertous contract by which the suit is prosecuted, and that fact comes
to the knowledge of the court, it should dismiss the suit: .Barber
v. Barber, 14 Wis. 143; Webb v. Armstrong, 5 Humph. 381.
Others appear to give a qualified approval to the doctrine. On the
other hand a number of cases hold that the fact that the suit is being
prosecuted under a champertous contract is no defence, and that the
illegality of such a contract can only be set up when it is sought to
enforce the contract: Hilton v. Woods, L. R., 4 Eq. Cas. 432 ; Whitrey v. Kirtland, 27 N. J. Eq. 33; Allison v. Bd. Co., 42 Iowa
274; Courtright v. Burns, 3 McCrary 60. Unless the plaintiff's
title by which he seeks to enforce a right is infected by a champertous contract, we see no reason why the suit may.not proceed, though
such a contract may exist as between the plaintiff and his attorney.
It is time enough to turn a party out of court when he asks the aid
of a court to enforce such a contract. This is in substance the rule
as to most illegal contracts, and there is no good reason at this day
for making aft exception in this class of contracts.
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Certain policy holders brought to light the facts upon which this
suit is founded, and were permitted by the court to prosecute the
same in the name of the receiver upon indemnifying him, and as a
consequence the funds in his hands, against the payment of costs.
These policy holders were butprotecting their own rights. They could
not well sue in their own names. In such cases it is not an uncommon
thing for cautious courts to require that the officer be made safe
against costs of long and tedious suits. Thus far there is no element
of champerty in the defence. It would seem the defendant offered
to prove that the attorney by whom the suit was instituted and who
represented these policy holders gave the bond, and further that he
had an agreement with the receiver by which he was to have a certain portion of the avails of the suit for his services. In view of
this offer let it be conceded for the purposes of this case without
deciding the question that the agreement between the attorney and
the receiver was champertous, still applying the principle before
announced, that constituted no defence to this action. The receiver's
account will come before the court for its approval, and it will be
time enough then to examine into the question of the validity of
the agreement. The.plaintiff's title is in no wise affected by the
illegal agreement even if any there was. We do not think public
policy requires the courts to turn aside and investigate such side
issues. The judgment in this case, from which both parties came
to this court, is affirmed.
HEiRY, C. J., dissents. The other judges concur.
Fduciary Characterof Directorsto the
Corporation and Duties springing from
such Relations.-The relation of directors and officers to the corporation is
fiduciary ; they are trustees and agents
of the corporation and stockholders;
they occupy a position of the highest
trust and confidence; and the utmost
good faith is required in the exercise of
the powers conferred upon them : Green's
Brice's Ultra Vires 477, 478, n. a;
Morawetz on Priv. Corp., sect. 243, and
Cases ; loylc v. Plattsburgh, 4-c., Rd.,
54 N. Y. 314, 328; Cumberland Coal
Co. v. Sherman, 30 Barb. 553; 559,
577; 3 Pumerov's Eq. Jur., sects.
1088-1090; Woods' Field's Corp., 2d
ed., sects. 154, 155 ; Ewell's Evans's

Agency *276 et seq., sect. 4 ; Pierce on
Railroads 45, and cases; Pearson v.
Concord Rd.. Co., (N. H. S. C.), 16
Rep. 463, and cases; European Rd. Co.
v. Poor, 59 Me. 277 ; Butt v. Wood,
38 Barb. 188; York, 6-c., Bd. v..Hudson, 16 Beav. 499 ; Hale v. Bridge Co.,
8 Kan. 466 ; Port v. Russell, 36 Ind.
60; Bank v. Downey, 53 Cal. 463;
Corbett v. Woodward, 5 Saw. C. C. 403.
"Whether a director of a corporation
is to be called a trustee or not in the
strict sense of the word, there can be no
doubt that his character is fiduciary,
being entrusted by others with powers
which are to be exercised for the common
and general interests of the corporation :"1
Boyle v. Plattsburgh, d:c., Rd., supra.
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"The relation between directors of a
corporation and its stockholders is that
of trustee and cestui que trust :" Butt T.
Wood, supra. Theirs is an office of
trust. "Persons who become directors
of a corporation, place themselves in the
situation of trustees, and the relation of
trustee and cestui que trust is thereby
created between them and the stock-

interests of his beneficiary; he cannot
make profits out of the trust property or
his office, nor assume a position antagonistic to his fiduciary character. He is
required to exercise the highest good
faith in executing his trust; is strictly
accountable for all losses occasioned by
breach of or neglect of duty; must turn
over to the cestui que trust all profits
holders :" per ROmILLY, M. R., in The realized from the trust property or office :
York 4- Midland Rd. v. Hudson, 16 Goodin v. Cincinnati, 4c., Rd., 18 Ohio
Beav. 99. They must be held as occu- St. 183 ; 2 Lind. on Part. (Ewell's ed.),
pying a fiduciary relation to the stock- *591 ; I Perry on Trusts, 427 ; Sudholders, for and in behalf of whom gen v. Crossland, 3 Sm. & G. 192;
Sloo v. Law, 3 Blatch. 459; Jackson v.
they act :" per APPLETON, C. J., in
European, 4'c., Rd. v. Poor, 59 Maine Ludeling, 21 Wall. 625: Bain v. Browm,
277. They are in regard to all matters 56 N. Y. 285 ; Ackerman v. Helsey,38'N.
entered into in behalf of the stockholders J. Eq. 501 ; s. c. Am. & Eng. Corp.
to be treated as agents: Luxembourg Casei 239 ; Penna. Rd. Co.'s Appeal, 80
Penn. St. 265 ; Abbot v. Am. HardRubRd. v. Magnay, 25 Beav. 586.
And as trustees and agents of the cor- ber Co., 33 Barb. 578; Peabody v. Flint,
poration and of the stockholders, they 6 Allen 52, 56, et seq.
Many cases hold that the rule which
are subject to the strict rules which govern the relations of trustee and cestuique forbids a trustee from dealing with the
trustpropertyin his personal capacity, is
trust, in all their dealings as directors of
the corporation : Wardell v. Railroad, so strict that it inhibits all inquiry Into
103 U. S. 657, 658, and cases; s. c. 4 the fairness of the transaction : Story on
Dill. C. C. 330 ; Luxembourg Rd. v. Agency (9th ed.), sects. 210, 211, pp.
Magnay, 25 Beav. 586; Corbett v. 239, 247 ; 1 Story's Eq. Jr. (11th ed.),
W'oodward, 5 Saw. C. C. 403; Bliss v. 322, p. 340 ; Pars. on Cont. (7th ed.)
Matteson, 45 N. Y. 22; s. o. 52 Barb. 87; Ashuelot v. Elliot,57 N. H. 397; Low335 ; Koeler v. Black River, 4-c., Rd., therv. Lowther, 13 Ves. 103 ; East India
2 Black 715, 720; Charitable Corp. v. Co. v. Henchman, 1 Yes. Jr. 289;
Sutton, 2 Atk. 404; Robinson v. Smith, Davoue v. Fanning, 2 Johns. Ch. 252;
McConnellv. Gibson, 12 fI1. 128 ; hight
3 Paige Ch. 222; s. c. 24 Am. Dec. 212;
Flitcrafi's Case, 21 L. R., Ch. Div. V. Blackmar, 2 Mich. 330; Michoud v.
Girod, 4 How. 503; Green v. Sargeant,
519; s. c. 52 Law Jour. R. (N. S.)
27 ; Jones v. Morrison, 31 Minn. 140, 23 Vt. 466; Aberdeen Ry. v. Blaikie,
et seq.; San Diego v. Railroad, 44 Cal. I Macq. 461; Gardner v. Ogden, 22
106. "Out of the identity of these rela- N. Y. 327; Duncomb v. Rd., 84 Id.
190; Coleman v. Second. Ave Rd., 38
tions necessarily spring- the same duties,
the same dangers, and the same policies Id. 201; Barnes v. Brqwn, 80 Id. 527 ;
of the law :" Bedford v. Bowser, 48 Razisin v. Clark, 41 Md. 158; s c. 20
Penn. St. 29 ; Abbot v. American Hard Am. R. 66 ; Rice v. Wood, 113 Mass.
133; Mlarsh v. W hitmore, 21 Wall. 178;
Rubber Co., 33 Barb. 578; Overend
Gurney Co. v. Gibb, 42 L. J. Ch. 67 ; L. Goodin v. Canal Co., 18 Ohio St. 169 ;
Railroad v. Kelly, 77 Ill. 426 ; Currier
R., 5 Eng. &Irish App. 480.
Hence as such trustee or agent, a di- v. Green, 2 N. H. 225 ; Perkins v. Thomprector cannot legally exercise his powers son, 3 N. H 144; Brackett v. Tillotfor his own personal ends against the son, 4 Id. 208 ; Remick v. Butterfield,
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31 Id. 70; Hoitt v. Webb, 36 Id. 158,

Corp. (1lth ed.), sect. 233, n. a, sect.
163; Sparhawk v. Allen, 21 Id. 9;
312; Adams's Doctrine of Equity 60 ;
French v,. Carrier, 47 Id. 88; Hoit v.
Beeson v. Beeson 9 Penn. St. 280r;
Russell, 56 Id. 559-; Holtv. Holt, I Ch. Ashhurst's Appeal, 60 Id. 290; McNeils
v. Gates, 41 Ark. 261, 269.
Cas. 190; Coles v. Trecothick, 9 Yes.
234; E parte Hughes, 6 Id. 617; Ex
If such fairness is not established,
parte Bennett, 10 Id. 385; Oliver v.
courts of equity treat the case as one of
Court, 8 Price 127 ; Fox v. M1ackreth. 2
constructive fraud: 1 Story's Eq. Jur.
Bro-. Ch. 400; York Building Co. v.
(11th ed.) sect. 311, 321, 322; CumMackenzie, 8 Bro. P. C. 42; Afolony v.
berland Coal - Iron Co. v. Parish, 42
Kernan, 2 Dru. & War. 31; Murphy v. Md- 598 ; Pair&
v-. Vickery, 37 Id. 467.
O'0Sea, 2 Xones & Lat. 422 ; Moore v.
Fraud need not he established to comMoore, I Seld. 256 ; Conger v. Ring, II
pel the trustee or agent to account for
Barb. 356; Pensonneau v. Bleaktey, 14 profits realized out of the trust property
ItI. 15 ; Clute v. Barron, 2 Mich. 330
or his office : Dauoue-v. Fanning, 2 John.
Allen v. Bryant, 7 Ired. Eq. 276 ; White Ch. 255, 260a X. Y Cent. Ins. Cb. v.
.v. Trotter, 14- Sr-. & M1. 30;. Huell v. Nat. Prot. ns. CrO., 14 N. Y.. 85, 91 ;
Bucdingham, 16ra. 284 rHatckv. Hatdr, Conkeyr. Bond,36 Id. 427, 429; Gilleet
9 Yes. 297 ; Whdpdale v. Cbokson, I v. Peppercorne,a Bear. 78, 84 ; Carrier
Yes. Sr. 9 ;-Hughes v. Watson, ScotlanT v. N. Y., 4-c,, Rd, 35 Hun (N. Y.),
1846 ; Haolv. Brown, 3 Bro. C. (1. 177 z 355 ; Marsk v. Whitmore, 21 Wall. 178.
Keecclv.Sandford. 3 Eq. Cas.-Abr. 741;
183; Michoud-v. Gfirod 4- Haw. 503;
In re Boyes Trust, t Mae. & G. 488;
Flagg v. Manhattar Byz. Co., 21 Am.
Ex parte-James, 8 Ves. 337; Ogden v.
L. Reg. (N. S.), 787, 788.; Greenlaw
Murray, 39 N.Y. 202 ; Torreyv. Bank, v. King, 3 Iloaw. 49, 61;. Ex parte
9 Paige 649; eicett v. Miller, 10 N. Jame, 8 Ves. 37, a44 ; Metroporitan
Y. 402; Van .Bpps v. Van Epps, 9 Efevated Rd. v. Manhattan levatedRd.,
Paige 237.; Bergen v. Bennett, I Caines
11 Daly's Rep. 373, 472 etseg.
Gas- 19 ; Munro- v. Alaire, 2 Id. 183 ;
He must account for all profits improYeakell v. Litchfield, 13- Allen 417 ; 4
perly made, for all moneys improperly
Kent's Com. 438.
received, and for losses occasioned by
Other cases permit an investigation of
breaches of trust- or neglect of duty.
the transaction, yet where such inquiry For instance, contracts with the corpomay be had, the burden is upon the trus- ration in which the trustee is interested :
tee or agent to vindicateL his dealings Jackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall. 616;
from all suspicion, and establish their
Hognman v. Coal Co., 16 Md. 486;
perfect fairness and equity : Cruce v.
Brewster v. Stratman, 4 Mo. App. 41 :
Cruce, 81 Mo. 676, 685; Cumberland European Rd. v. Poor, 59 Me. 277 ; 1
Coal 4-Iron Co. v. Parish, 42 Md. 598 ; Story's Eq. Jur. (11th ed.), 339, sect.
Rice's Appeal, 79 Penna. St. 168, 204;
321 ; I Lindley on Part. 553, 590;
Pairov. Vickery, 37 Md. 467 ; Flagg v.
Mfercantile Mut. iIns. Co. v. Hope Ins.
Mf. Ry. Co., 21 Am. Law Reg. 775;
Co., 8 Mo. App. 408; Wardell v. Union
St. James' Church v. Church of Redeemer, P. Rd., 103 U. S. 651, 658, s.c. 4
45 Barb. 356 ; Pearsonv. Concord lid., Dill. C. C. 330; Gilman, ,.c, Rd. v.
16 Rep. 463, 464; Rolling Stock Co. v.
Kelly, 77 Ill. 426, 434; U. S. Rolling
Rd., 34 Ohio St. 466; 1 Story's Eq.
Stock Co. v. Atlantic Rd., 34 Ohio St.
Jur. (11th ed.) sects. 311, pp. 321,322;
450, 465; ifower v. Staples, 32 Minn.
1 Perry on Trusts (2d ed.), sect. 209 ; 284, 289; Pierce on Railroads 43, and
Pierce on Railroads 36 ; Morawetz on cases; Ewell's Evans on Agency, sect.
Priv. Corp., see. 245 ; Angell & Ames on
4, p. 375, et seq.; Stewart v. Lehigh Val-
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leg Rd., 38 N. J. L. 522; Paine v. Mining Co., 61 Penn. St. 202, 217. If
Louisville Rd., 31 Ind. 283; Green's
losses result to the beneficiary in conseBrice's Ultra Vires 479, 480, n. a;
quence of illegal acts: 1. Lindley on
Boyle v. Rd., 54 N. Y. 314, 328, 329 ; Part. (Ewell's ed.), 592 ; Society of
Aberdeen Ai. v. Blakie, 1 Macq. H. Practcal Knowledge v. Abbott, 2 Beav.
L. Cas. 461 ; Barts v. Brown, 77 559 ; Ackerman v. Halsey, 38 N. J. Eq.
"II. 226; Mayor v. lanman, 57 Ga. 370;
501, s. c. I Am. and Eng. Corp. Cas.
Alford v. Miller, 32 Conn. 543; Polar 239 ; as in carrying on a rival business:
Star Lodge v. Sime, 16 La. Ann. 76 ; Lengle v. Nat. ns. Co., 45 Mo. 109 ;
Railroad v. Bowler, 9 Bush 468; Jones Glassington v. Thwaites, 1 Sim. & St.
v. Ark. Agr. 4- Alech. Assoc., 38 Ark. 124 ; England v. Curling, 8 Beav.
129;
17; Blake v. Rd., 56 N. Y. 485; Pbrt Brewster v. Stratman, 4 Mo.
App.: 42;
v. Russell, 36 Ind. 60, 64. He must Covington Rd. v, Bowler, 9 Bush (Ky.:),
restore all profits made out of the trust 468; McAllen v. Woodbock, 66 Akd.
property, 1 to the utmost extent :" T/e 174; Stewart v. Lehigh Valley Rd., 38
York, 4-c., Rd. v. Budson, 16 Bear. 485 ; N. J. L. (9 VYioom) 505; Gardner
v.
Parker v. McKenna, L.R., 10 Ch. Ap. Butler, (N. J.)) 3 Stewart 702, 721;
96 ; 1 Lindley on Part. 576, 587, 588 Drury v. Cross, 7 Wall. 299; Meeker v.
(Ewell's ed.) ; Pomeroy v. Benton, 57
Wznthrop Iron Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 48;
Mo. 531, s.c. 77 Mo. 64, (full state- or in speculating, in the
trust property,
ment of the law) ; I Perry on Trusts ak in purchases and sales, the trustee
(3d ed.) 250, sect. 207 ; Id. 538, sect. must make good the loss.
"Directors
432; Ryan v. L. A. &- N. tW. Ry.,
cannot sell to or for themselves." They
21 Kansas 365, 398; Bank v. Downey, cannot unite in themselves the opposite
53 Cal. 466, S. c. 31 Am. Rep. 62;
characters of buyer and seller: 1 Story's
Mercantile Credit Assoc. v. Coleman, L. Eq. Jur. (1Ith ed.), sect. 321 ; C6ok v.
R., 6 H. Lds. 189; Paine v. Rd., 31 Berlin Woollen Co., 43 Wis. 433; CumInd. 282 Koelder v. Black River Falls berland Coal 4- ron Co. v. Shermah,
30
Iron Co., 2 Black 720 ; Morawetz on Barb. 553, s. c. 8 Am. Law Reg. 333;
Priv. Corp., sect. 244; Field on Corp.,
Cumberland Coal 6 -Iron Co. v. Parish,
sect. 174, and note 3; Id., sect. 175;
42 Md. 598 ; Colemanv.SecondAv. Rd..
Woods's Field on Corp. (2d ed.), sect.
38 N. Y. 201.
156; Gilman, 4-c., Rd. v. Kelly, 77 Ii.
Joint Liability.-Nor is the liability
426, 435 (full statement of the law) ;
confined to the director, trustee or agent
Green's Brice's Ultra Vires 477-8, and who actually
participates in the wrong,
cases in note a; Id. 480, 481, 482;
but he is liable for the spoliations of coJackson v. Ludeling, 21 Wall 616 ; Par- trustees of which
he had notice, or which
shall's Appeal, 65 Penn. St. 224: Tyrhe might have prevented by proper dilirell v. Bank of London, 10 H. Lds. C.
gence : Joint Stock Discount Co. v.Brown,
26; Foss v. Harbottle, 2 Hare 461 ;
L. R., 8 Eq. Cas. 381; Land Credit Co.
Brewer v. Boston Theatre, 104 Mass.
v. LordFermroy, L. R., 5 Ch. App. Cas.
395 ; Gregoryv. Patchett, 33 Beav. 595 ;
763 ; Ryan v. Rd., 21.Kansas 365; SiAtwool v. Merryweather, L. R., 5 Eq.
mons v. Vulcan Oil Co., 61 Penn. St.
464 n. ; Barnesv. Brown, 80 N. Y. 535;
202; Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch.
Benson v. Hawthorne, I Y. & C. (Ch.)
222, s. O. 24 Ain. Dec. 212; Heath v.
326: Gaskell v. Chambers, 26 Bear. 360 ;
Erie Rd., 8 Blatchf. 347, 411.
9 Eq. Rep. 480; King v. Wise, 43 Cal.
Where trustees are jointly implicated
628, 634 ; I Perry on Tr. (3d ed.), sect.
in a breach of trust, the beneficiary may
429 ; Morrison v. Ogdensburg Rd., 52
hold either one or all for the whole loss;
Barb. 173; Simons v. Vulcan Oil 4Wilkinson v. Parry, 4 Russ. 272 ; Lewin
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.n Trusts, 8th ed. 1885, p. 988, par.
A ; Chancellor v. Aiorecraft, 11 Bear.
.64 ; Lyse v. Kingdon, I Collyer 184 ;
Perry on Trusts, 3d ed., p. 496, sect.
-48; Wilson .v. Moore, I M. & K. 146-;
Story's Eq. P1., 9th ed., sect. 213, pp.
199, 200, and cases ; 2 Story's Eq. Jur.,
Ilth ed. sect. 1280, p. 596; Id. sect.
1257 ; Franco v. Franco, a Ves. 75;
Rehden v. Wesley,29 Bear. 215; Jenkins v. Robertson, I Eq. Rep. 123; Richardson Y. Jenkins, I Drewry 477, 483;
Walker v. Symonds, 3 Swanst. 75-- May
v. Selby, I Y. & Coil. Ch. 235 ; Bridgetv. lames, I CoIL 72.
Active participation irrthe misfeasance
is not required, nor actual knowledge
that an-abuse of trust is intended ; silent
connivance is sufficient to- charge the
trustee, when it may be observed to afford the means of rendering the- misconduct of the others eefietive -I Weetjen v-.
Vibbard, 5 Hun (N.. Y)_ 265 ; - Story's.
Eq. Jur., 11th ed., p. 590, sect. 1275.
Negligence or supine indifference on the
part of the. trustee respecting hs duties
to the trust, although he had no hand in
the spoliation, is-sufficient to charge him :
Robinson v. Smith, 3 Paige Ch. 222 ; s.
c. 24 Am. Dec. 212; Percy v. M1illaudon, 3 La. 568; Smith v. Pettigrew, 34
N. J. Eq. 2W6 ; Oviritable Corp. v. Sutton, 2 Atk. 400.
Ratification and Acquiesene.-Of
course the beneficiary may ratify the acts
of the trustee when the latter occupied
these dual positions, as buyer and'seller,
&e.x and will thus be barred from relief,
or he may assent to them by his silence;
but acquiescence to- produce a bar must
take place with full knowledge, by the
beneficiary, of all facts ; and many
cases hold that it must also be with full
knowledge of his legal rights arising
from those ficts. Nothing short of this
will amount to such acquiescence os will
defeat the liability of a defaulting fiduciary : 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sect. 1083,
p. 662 ; Holinan Stpam Coal Co. v.
Cumberland Coal Co., 16 Md. 456;
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Ryan v. Learenworth Rd., 21 Kan. 365,
406; Gilman Rd. v. Kelly, 77 Ill. 426.;
Kerr on Fraud and Mistake, pp. 1.6,
300, 302; 1 Lindley on Part. (Ewell's
ed.)-538 - W[ardell v. Railroadr 103 U.
S. 65-1 ; s. c. 4 Dill. C. C. 330; Morawetz on Priv. Corp., sect. 242-;. Pickering
v. Stephenson, IL. R., 14 Eq. 322 ; Mfinor v. JMechanicsl Bank, 1 Pet. 46, 71 ;
Salem Bank v. Gloucester Bank, 17
Iass. 1, 30,; St: ,Tames Church v. Chumrc
of Redeemer, 45 Barb. 356 ; City of
Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. - 540,
552. The doctrine of ratification proceeds upon the principle that such contracts are not void, but voidable only at
the objection of the cestuf que trust. See
cases, suprair
Laches.-So the beneficiary will be
denied relief if he suffers the- transactions to stand an. unreasonable length of
-time, without taking the proper steps- to
rescind them : Chapman v. ladison Rd.r
6 Ohio St. 119 ; Peabody r. Fluit,6 Alien
57; Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. (fass.)
252 ; Samuel v. Hfolladay, I Woos-.
416. But that the defaulting trustee
may invoke laches as a defence, there
must be full and complete knowledte on
the part of the cestui que trust, of all of'
the facts of the acalings, and where such
knowledge is wanting, this ples is unavailing: Twin Lick Oil Co. v. Marbury,
91. U. S. 587, 593; Bacfger v. Badger,
2 Wall. 87, 92, 93; IHaruood v. Rd.,
17 Id. 78; Gilman Rd. v. Kelly, 77
Ill. 426, 437 ; Ifoffman Steam Coal Co.
v. Cumberland Co., 16 Md. 456, 468, and
cases cited in opinion, pp. 468-47a;
Ryan v. Rd., 21 Kan. 365, 404; Oakland v. Carpentier, 13 Cal. 540, 552.
Limitation.-In these cases it is the
duty of the beneficiary to make complaint and adopt measures to avoid such
transactions, within a reasonable time
after Ie has become fully acquainted with
all the facts. But what is such reasonable time must, of course, be determined
by the chancellor, upon the circumstances of each particular case. No
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general rule can be formulated. Mr.
Justice MuLRn, in Twvin Lia Oil Co. v.
Marbury, 91 U. S. 591, says: "The
doctrine is well settled that the option to
avoid such sale must be exercised within
a reasonable time. This has never been
held to be any determined number of
days or years, as applied to every case,
like the statute of limitations, but must
be decided in each case upon all elements of it whieh affect that question.
There are generally the presence or absence of the parties at the place of the
transaction, their knowledge or ignorance
of the sale and of the facts which render
it voidable, the permanent or fluctuating
character of the transaction, as affecting
its value, and the actual rise or fall of
the property in value during the period
within which this option might be exercised. In fixing this period in any particular case, we are but little aided by
the analogies of the statute of limitations; while, though not falling exactly
within the rule as to the time for rescinding, or offering to rescind, a contract by one of the parties to it for actual
fraud, the analogies are so strong as to
give to this latter great force in the consideration of the case. In this -cIass of
cases the party is bound to act with reasonable diligence as soon as a fraud is
discovered or his right to rescind is gone.
No delay for the purpose of enabling the
defrauded party to speculate upon the
chance which the future may give him of.
deciding profitably to himself, whether he
will abide by his bargain, or rescind it
is allowed in a court of equity."
In Harwood v. Rd., 17 Wall. 81, iris
said: "Without reference to any statute
of limitations, the courts have adoptedthe principle that the delay which will
defeat a recovery must depend upon the
particular circumstances of each case."
The Supreme Court of Missouri, after
citing a number of cases, said, in Kitchen
v. Rd., 69 Mo. 265 : "The doctrine as
recognised in the above cases is that the
option to avoid such a sale, as is here

complained of, must be exercised within
a reasonable time, and unless so exercised equitable relief will be denied,
especially when new rights, equities and
interests have arisen, .-d the parties
cannot be restored to t, , original position."
In Graham v. Birkenhead, 2
McN. & G, 159, eighteen months wtsis
considered too long. In Badgerv. Bcdqe,
2 Wall. 87, 92, 93,it is said where the
trust is clearly established and the facts
have been fraudulently concealed by the
trustee from the knowledge of the cestui
que trust, lapse of time will not bar the
latter's rights. In Marsh v. W7idtmore,
21 Wall. 178, an attorney sold bonds of
a client at public sale and bought them in
himself, and the client was fully aware
of the purchase and acquiesced in it for
twelve years; held too late to impeach
the sale. In Vigers v. ike, 8 Cl. &
Fin. 562, 650, a trustee of the company
made a contract with a third person from
which he realized a profit at the expense
of the company. The company had full
knowledge of all the facts and acquiesced
in it for a considerable length of time;
herd, it could not be rescinded. The
court said the defendant cannot raise a
more effectual bar "than by showing
that the plaintiff, who, from the beginning, cognisant of all-of the matters com-'
plained of, or after full information conceruing them, continued to deal with the
property,' and even to exhaust in the
enjoyment as by working the mines."
In Wentworth v. Lloyd, 32 Beav. 467,
an agent purchased property of his principal in his representative capacity. The
principal had full knowledge of it and
did not bring suit for six years ; held, too
late, See, also, Gregory v. Patchett, 3S
Beav 595 ; Hazelhurst v. ,avannah Rd.,
437 Ga. 13, 56 , Cozart v. Ga. Rd. 4.
Bankfng Co., 54 Ga. 379 ; 2 High on
Inj. (2d ed.) sect- 1229, p. 803; Id.
sect. 1205, p. 792; Id. sect. 1206, p.
793.
Lapse of Time will not Bar Direct
Trust.-It is a well-settled principle of
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equity that lapse of time will not bar acontinuing and subsisting trust---one
that will be recognised only in a court
of equity, as between trustee and cestui
que trust: Lewin on Trusts (8th ed,
1885) 863; Perry on Trusts (3d ed.),
sect. 228; Decouche v. Savet er, 3
Johns. Ch. 190: 216; Cholmondetey v.
Clinton, 2 Merivale 360 ; Scott v. Haddock, 1I Ga. 258, 263; Stone v. Stone,
L. R., 5 Ch. App. 74; Woodhouse v.
Woodliouse, L. R., 8 Eq. 514; Carpenter r. Cushman, 105 Mass. 417 ;
Kane v. Bloodgood, 7 Johns. Oh. 90;
Bailey v. Barnett, 12 Mo. 3; Dillon v.
Bates, 39 Id. 292; Bill v. Bailey, &
Me. App. 85, 89. In such cases the
Statute of Limitations is inapplicable Bright v. Legerton, 29 BeaR. 60 ;
Obee v. Bishop, I De G., V. & X.
137. An agent who stands in a fiduciary relation to his principal cannot
claim advantage of lapse of time:
Burdick v. Garrick, L. R., 5 Ch. App.
233.
"The question is, in effect,
whether delay will purge a fraud?
Never while I sit here! Every day
adds to its injustice and multiplies its
oppression," per Lord WORTHINGTON,
in Alden v. Gregory, 2 Eden 280. "It
is certainly true that length of time is no
bar to a trust-cearly established trust;
and in cases where fraud is imputed and
pr. red, length of time ought not, on
principles of eternal justice, to be admitted to repel relief. On the other
hand it would seem that the length of
time during which the fraud has been
successfully concealed and practiced, is
rather an aggravation of the offence,
and calls more loudly upon a court of
equity to give ample and decisive
relief," per STRONG, J., in Prevost v.
Gratz, 6 Wheat. 481. " No length of
time can prevent the unkennelling of a
fraud ;" per Lord EnsIcrNE. quoted in
Badger v. Badger, 2 Wall. 92.
But that lapse of time may not constitute a bar the trust must be direct and
exclusive, cognisable in a court of

equity, and the question between the
trustee and cestui que trust: AMcCandless's Estate 61 Penn. St. 9; 2 Story's
Eq. Jur. (11th ed.) sect. 1520 a, p
851 ; 2 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur., sect. 1083,
p. 662 ; Philippiv. Phillippi,116 U. S.
Rep. 151.
"The trusts intended by a court of
equity not to be reached or affected by
the Statute of Limitations, are those
technical and continuing trusts which
are not at all cognisable at law, but
fall within the- proper, peculiar andL
exclusive jurisdiction of courts of
equity: " Johnson v. Smith's Admr., 27
Mo. 591. See- Carr v. Thompson, 87
N. Y. 160;, Ashhurst's Appeal, 60 Penn.
St. 290; .Rogers v. Brown, 61 Mo.
187.
Many cases hold that the Statute of
Limitations may be invoked in all cases
where the trust is raised by implication
of law, and where an action at law
could be maintained to recover the
money affected by the trust: Barbien v.
Barbien, 23 How. 207: Robinson v.
Book-, 4 Mason 152, and cases cited ;
Wells v. Perry, 62 Mo. 573 ; Smith v.
Ricords, 52 Id. 581 ; s. C. 56 Id. 553;
Keeton v. Keeton, 20 Id. 530.
Courts of equity frequently follow by
analogy the Statute of Limitations, as
adopted by the law courts, in proceedings like in the principal case. But in
purely equitable actions courts of equity
usually "act solely upon, their own inherent rules, altogether outside of and
independent of the Statute of Limitations:" Kelly v. Hurt, 74 Mo. 561.
If there has been gross laches in prosecuting the claim, or long acquiescence in
the prosecuting of adverse rights, it will
refuse to interfere, though less than the
statutory period has elapsed : Id. See
Twin Lid.; Oil Co. v. M1arbury, supra:
Bliss v. Prinhard, 67 Mo. 181, where
the whole doctrine is fully discussed :
Smith v. Washington, 11 Mo. App. 519,
525.
Facts Relating to the Discovery of the
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Fraudmust be fully set out.-And where
the question- arises as in the principal
ease, where the plaintiff seeks to avoid
the statute of limitations, many authorities hold that the facts relating to the
discovery of the fraud should be fully
stated in the defence, e. g., when and
how the facts were discovered, &c., that
the defendant may be permitted to meet
them at the trial: Moore v. Granby Mining 6- Smelting Co., 80 Mo. 91. "The
circumstances of the discovery must be
fully stated and proved or the delay
which has occurred must be shown to be
consistent with the requisite diligence :"
Parv. Hilton, 1 Cart. 0. C. 390. "As
lapse of time necessarily obscures the
truth, and destroys the evidence of past
transactions, courts of chancery will
exercise great caution in sustaining bills
which seek to disturb them. They will
hold the complainant to stringent rules of
pleading and evidence, and require him
to make out a clear case. * * * There
must be distinct averments as to the,
time when the fraud, mistake, concealment, or misrepresentation was discovered, and what the evidence is, so that
the court may clearly see whether by the
exercise of ordinary diligence, the discovery might not have been made
sooner :" Stearns v. Page, 7 How. 828,
829.
"The bill must be specific in
stating the facts and circumstances
which constitute the fraud, and also as to
the time it was discovered.
This is
necessary to enable the defendant to meet
the fraud and the alleged time of its
discovery:" per Mr. Tustice McLEx.- in
Moore v. Green, 19 How. 72. " The
party who makes such appeal (to avoid
the statute) should set forth in his bill,
specifically what were the impediments
to an earlier prosecution of the claim ;
how he came to be so long ignorant of
his rights, and the means used by the respondent to fraudulently keep him in
ignorance, and how and when he first
came to a knowledge of the matters alleged in his bill:" Badger v. Badger, 2

* Wall 87, 92, 93. See also Wood v.
Carpenter, 101 U. S. 140.
Champerty.-It is a well settled principle, founded upon public policy, that actions growing out of a champertous
agreement cannot be maintained: Gilbert
v. Holmes, 61 Ill. 556; Cardwell v.
Sprigg, 7 Dana (Ky.) 39; Barnes v.
Strong, I Jones Eq. (N. C.) 100; Vincent v. Asldey, 3 Head (Tenn.) 594;
ayncsv. Coyne, 10 Tenn. 343: Cougdin
v. N. Y. 4-H. B. Rd., 71 N. Y. 452;
Crowley v. Vaughan, 11 Bash (Ky.) 517.
Rives v. Weaver, 36 Miss. 383; Greenman v. Cohee, 61 Ind. 206; Barker v.
Barker, 14 Wis. 143; Weekly v. Hall,
13 Ohio 175; Webb v. Armstrong, 5
Humph. 381; Arden v. Patterson, 5
Johns. Ch. 44 ; Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo.
58; Harman v. Brewster, 7 Bush 355 ;
Brown v. Beauchamp, 5 Mon. (Ky.) 416.
This is an old principle, but the law as
expounded by the earlier judges and law
writers is still in force. " There is nothing in the law ofchamperty, as expounded
by Blackstone and Bouvier and the
American courts in the adjudicated case,
which we have cited, that is not applicable to our condition. The race of intermeddlers and busy-bodies is not extinct
* ** A man may have a doubtful claim
to property in the possession of another,
who would hesitate to incur the expense
of testing its validity, will readily agree
that one who will bear the burden of the
contest and take part of the recovery for
his pay, may institute the suit in his name.
Such contracts are champertous, and
should be so held on principle everywhere:" Duke v. Harper, 66 Mo. 60.
And when the fact that such a suit is
being prosecuted on sucha contract comes
to the knowledge of the court, a number
of cases hold that the court should dismiss
the proccedings : -Morrison v. Deadericr,
10 Humph. (Tenn.) 342; Webb v.
Armstrong, 5 Id.379 ; Barker*. Barker,
14 Wis. 142; Swanston v. Morning Star
Mining Co., 13 Fed. Rep. 1882, p. 215.
But others hold that the fact that the suit
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is being prosecuted under a ehampertous
contract is no defence, but thatits legality
can he attacked only in a proceeding to
enforce the contract, see cases cited in
opinion of principal case. In the priucipal case tho court refused ro interfere,

as the plaintiff's title by which he sought
tor enforce his right was not affected By
the illegal contract.
EUoEn MCQUmWN.
St. Louis, Mo.

&prema Court of Micligan.
THOMAS v. aAULKETT.
A contract between a physician and a party injured by a railroad company-that
the.physician shall go with the injured party to the counsel and medical advisers of
the company and explain the nature and extent of the injuries, and receive a&compensation for so doing an amount graded by the amount awarded- by the company,
is illegal and void.

to Allegan.
Poe
v e Hart,for plaintiffThew "Latta, for defendant and appellant.
ERROR

CmPBnLL,. J.-Plaintiff sued defendant for services in going
with him from Allegan to Detroit, and giving his viewsabout defendant's condition, arising out of injuries in a railroad accident upon
the Lake Shore & Michigan Southern road. There were some further items for expenses and treatment. The defendant considered
that he had a cause of action-for his injuries, and had some correspondence with the company, who would not pay him what he was
willing to accept. Finally it was arranged that he should go to
Detroit and confer with the counsel of the company, and, if necessary, be examined. Plaintiff was to go with him, and defendant
procured a pass for both. Plaintiff had also a desire to attend a
medical commencement. The parties differ in their statements concerning the terms and arrangements.
Plaintiff testified in substance that, having ascertained that defend:ant was willing to accept $1200, although, as both testify, he thought
he ought to have- $1500, or more, they bad a conference, in which
it was understood that if defendant received $1500, plaintiff should
have $300 ; if 2000, $500; and in similar way for a larger sum.
Plaintiff's employment was to lay the facts before the company's
counsel and medical advisers. At Detroit, at plaintiff's suggestion,
defendant was examined by another surgeon; and he was also
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examined by Dr. McLean, the company's surgeon; and a settlement was finally had upon Dr.' McLean's report of the case, the
amount having been reached by a reduction of defendant's demand
of $2500 down to $1500. Defendant did all the pecuniary negotiating himself, but plaintiff advised him at different times what to
demand, and that he ought to, have all that he asked.
The declaration contained a special count and the common counts.
Such questions as arose under the special count, as such, were put
out of the case by its relinquishment on trial. As the demand for
compensation was for money actually due under any contract, if
one existed, it was recoverable under the common counts. The verdict of the jury was for an amount which, if based on the special
contract, must have left out items additional which had testimony
to support them. Nevertheless, we cannot say, as matter of law, that
the finding may not have been based on the special agreement to
which plaintiff testified. We must therefore treat it as in the case.
Upon the proof of the valu- of plaintiff's services, apart from any
special contract, we do not see that the testimony was improper. It
cannot be held, as matter of law, that the value of scientific services
depends on a man's actual average daily receipts. If that were so,
there could be no room for advancement. A physician's services
may be worth much more than this. A jury may properly have
before them all the elements which will aid them in forming a judgment, and may, where these elements are various, draw their own
conclusions by comparison. The services rendered here were the
description and medical interpretation of a serious and somewhat
obscure injury, which, it seems likely from the testimony of the
witnesses, required considerable professional skill to perceive and
appreciate, and .describe clearly. It appears also that the conclusions and descriptions of plaintiff corresponded with those of the
other gentlemen who acted in the matter. The value of a physician's services of that kind could not very well be measured by his
usual receipts in daily business to such an extent as to exclude
opinions of competent men as to their worth.
The only really important question before us is whether the
-special contract testified to, and on which the jury may have acted,
was legally valid. The testimony of defendant, as well as of other
witnesses, fails to indicate that plaintiff made any statements which
were not accurate. But the contract must be measured by its
tendency, and not merely by what was done to carry it out. There
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is no particular reason to suppose defendant got any more than he
should have got. This, however, is not the test. Wher-we come
down to the real nature of this alleged contract, it is one which contemplated that plaintiff was to give his view of the facts relating to
defendant's physical condition and injuries,_ as they had existed and
been developed undet his observation, and the medical bearing
of these facts, and the extent of past or future dangers and sufferings. While it is probable, from the medical testimony, that the
present condition and future prospects can be got at with considerable certainty, yet it is also possible that some complications may
escape detection, and some appearances may be ambiguous, unless
explained by previous symptoms or conditions. Beyond this there
can. be no doubt that suggestions may often be made by one- physician which. will aid others, to whom they might not have occurred
from their own experience or observation.
Under these circumstances, it is at least possible, if not probable,
that the judgment ultimately formed will- depend very much on thefacts and opinions, and the coloring of the statements furnished by
the person relied upon as best informed. He puts- himself in a
position 'where both, parties are expected to rely upon him, and to
act on what he says. When, under such circumstances, he makes
the disclosure of his knowledge and opinions the subject of a- contract, whereby his compensation isto depend on the amount obtained
by his employer by reason- of the disclosure, it is plain that he puts
himself in a position- where it is his interest to exaggerate. If he
were-to explain to those whom he is to influence that he is acting
under such an employment, and as a solicitor, then there would. be
nothing to put him on a different footing than other known agents.
But no such explanation_ was contemplated, and none given. And,
however honest a man's actual intentions may be, and however
truthful he may be, there is a direct temptation to misrepresent,
and a direct danger that the misrepresentation will operate injuriously to the parties dealt with. Such secret agreements by persons
putting themselves in positions of confidence come within recognised
prohibitory rules as tending to- defraud. In such- cases we cannot
expect to find precisely analogous precedents. but the principle is.
familiar and of long standing. It belongs with the class of combinations to raise prices by biddings at auction, orother devices whereby the illegality is not worked out merely by success, but inheres
in the transaction itself, and with those contracts where success is
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dependent on personal influence and persuasion, having the appearance of disinterestedness. Upon this point the court we think
erred in not so charging the jury; and therefore the judgment must
be reversed and a new trial ordered.
CoOLKY, 0. J., and CHAMPLIN, J., concurred.
We da not remember ever before to
have seen a case touching upon the question involved in the principal case. But
although it may be new in this instance,
the reasoning upon which the conclusion
arrived at is based, is so sensible and
clear that there would seem to be no
room for doubting its correctness.
In the language of Lord Chief Justice
WILMOT, in the leading case of Collins

v. Blantern, 2 Wilson 341; s. ,. I
Smith's Lead. Cas. *489, " This is a
contract to. tempt a man to transgress
the law, to do that which is injurious to
the community;" and, although no actual
wrong may have been done, as was well
observed by the learned judge who delivered the opinion of -the court, "the
contract must be measured by its tendency, and not merely by what was done
to carry it out." See Bliss v. Matteson,
52 Barb. 335, 348.
The American editors of Smith's
Leading Cases, in their note to Collins
v. Blantern, above cited, have well expressed the rule that should govern cases
of this sort: "It should, moreover, be
remembered that there are contracts
which the law will not permit to be
made, and acts which it views with disapprobation, not because they are necessarily wrongful, but because they are
attended with temptation to fraud or
misconduct, which human nature is not
strong enough to resist, and should, consequently, be taught to avoid: Fuller v.
Dame, 18 Pick. 472 ; 1 Lead. Cas. in
Eq. (3d Am. ed.) 211.
An agent is
not allowed to buy what he has been employed to sell ; an administrator to traffic with the money of the estate ; or any
one acting in a fiduciary capacity to
enter into an agreement by which he

may be led to make a profit at the expense of his trust. The particular
transaction may be entirely free from
blame, but it will not on that account be
less liable to be set aside as constructively
marked with fraud."
We cannot do better in this connection
than quote from the opinion of Chief
Justice SHAw, in the case of Fuler V.
Dane, 18 Pick. 472: "The law goes
further than merely to annul tontracts,
where the obvious and avowed purpose
is to do or cause the doing of unlawful
acts; it avoids contracts and promises
made with a view [and he might well
have added where the natural tendency
of. the contract is] to place one under
wrong influences, those which offer him
a temptation to do that which may injuriously affect the rights and interests
of third persons. A person having property, and being of sound mind, may
make a will in favor of whom he pleases.
A common friend may lawfully represent to him the expediency and fitness
of making a bequest in favor of a particular individual, and may repeat that
representation both in conversation and
in writing. Writing letters at the request of another and forhis benefit would,
under ordinary circumstances, be a proper consideration for a promise of compensation.
But to promise to pay
another for soliciting a will in his favor
would be void : Debenham'v. Ox, 1 Yes.
Sen. 276. A man might entertain a
very sincere opinion that a marriage between a gentleman of his acquaintance
and a lady of considerable fortune would
be highly beneficial and contribute to the
happiness of both parties, and he might
lawfully propose this to one or both.
But any promise of reward made to him

